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A re-appreciation of “conformity” 1 
 2 
Whiten & van de Waal (this volume) present an answer to a critical account of their 3 
conformity interpretations (van Leeuwen et al., 2015). Their target study (van de Waal 4 
et al., 2013) evidenced immigrant male vervet monkeys adjusting their food colour 5 
preferences to the preference demonstrated by the resident vervets, which was 6 
interpreted in terms of conformity. Van Leeuwen and colleagues (2015; also see van 7 
Leeuwen & Haun, 2013 and online commentary by Tennie, Fischer, Galef & Haun, 8 
2013, at Sciencemag.org) acknowledged the insight gained from the reported 9 
observations for our understanding of social learning processes in wild primates, but 10 
criticized van de Waal et al.’s conformity interpretation (2013) as alternative learning 11 
biases, other than conformity, could not be ruled out. In their reply to this critique, 12 
Whiten & van de Waal (this volume) systematically list their arguments against 13 
alternative explanations. Whiten & van de Waal (this volume) also present new data 14 
indicating that in their target study (2013) the “majority of individuals” opting to 15 
perform a specific behaviour correlated with the “majority of behaviours” performed 16 
across the population, thereby adding to a recent debate about how “the majority” 17 
should be operationalized in order to study conformist transmission (see Aplin et al., 18 
2015a in response to van Leeuwen et al., 2015). Here, we respond to Whiten & van de 19 
Waal (this volume) by i) discussing how their arguments against our alternative 20 
explanations for their conformity interpretation (as advanced in van de Waal et al., 21 
2013) may be misguided, ii) defending the position that their presented correlation 22 
between the “majority of individuals” and the “majority of behaviours” is tangential to 23 
the current debate, iii) presenting evidence in favour of our original suggestion to keep 24 
reliance on the “majority of individuals” and the “majority of behaviours” as two 25 
separate learning biases, and iv) realigning the debate between Aplin et al. 2015a and 26 
van Leeuwen et al. 2015 to focus again on animals’ observation records as prerequisite 27 
knowledge to interpret their behavioural decisions in terms of learning biases. 28 
 29 
Alternative explanations 30 
 In line with Whiten & van de Waal (this volume), we define conformity as 31 
“abandoning personal preferences or behaviours to match alternatives exhibited by a 32 
majority of others” (Haun, van Leeuwen & Edelson, 2013). In their original study (van 33 
de Waal et al., 2013), male vervet monkeys who were trained to prefer one of two food 34 
colours in their native group immigrated to a new group where the alternative food 35 
colour was preferred and adjusted their preferences accordingly (except for one high-36 
ranking male who maintained his native preference). These immigrants were typically 37 
confronted with a large group of residents feeding from the alternative food colour, 38 
while very few or none of the residents fed from the food colour the immigrants were 39 
most familiar with (see illustrations in Whiten & van de Waal, this volume). Van de 40 
Waal et al. (2013) interpreted these behavioural adjustments by the immigrants as 41 
‘conformity’. In response to this interpretation, van Leeuwen & Haun (2014; also see 42 
van Leeuwen et al. 2015) pointed out that although the immigrants might have been 43 
guided by inclinations to conform to the majority, alternatively, they might have been 44 
guided by other (social) learning biases that are independent of majority considerations. 45 
For instance, the immigrants might have been focused on copying particular resident 46 
individuals, like visibly dominant individuals, or indeed any resident individual, 47 
precipitated by their immigration-induced stress, anxiety or general state of uncertainty. 48 
Whiten & van de Waal (this volume) replied to this suggestion by arguing that any 49 
transmission bias other than ‘copy-the-majority’ is unlikely to explain the switching 50 
behaviour of the immigrants. For instance, they argue that the fact that the immigrants 51 
do not have female kin in their new group rules out a kin-based learning rule. Likewise, 52 
they propose that male vervets are relatively poor in recognizing the social hierarchy of 53 
females, ruling out a ‘copy high-rankers’ learning rule (Whiten & van de Waal, this 54 
volume). While these particular proposals may or may not be correct, more generally, 55 
we wish to emphasize that although field experiments with wild animals are to be 56 
applauded for their ecological validity, they do not have any superior claim on 57 
epistemological validity. When confounding effects cannot be controlled for rigorously, 58 
interpretation of observed patterns need to be made cautiously. 59 
 Whiten & van de Waal (this volume) argue most forcefully against the ‘random 60 
copying’ interpretation of their data, stating that: ‘…for the immigrant vervets to copy 61 
just one individual randomly would seem rather perverse in the face of the repeated, 62 
extensive and quite consistent scenarios of multiple monkey preferences staring 63 
immigrants in the face…’ (line 95-98). We disagree. Clearly, the sheer availability of 64 
information is no guarantee it will be utilized in expected ways, or, at all. Random 65 
copying is as good a predictor of the observed patterns of transmission as conformity: 66 
When observer monkeys are consistently confronted with the majority of residents 67 
feeding from one particular food colour, while only a few, or none, of the resident 68 
monkeys feed from the alternative, copying a random individual would, 69 
probabilistically, boil down to observer monkeys tending to use the foraging option 70 
demonstrated by the majority rather than that demonstrated by the minority, irrespective 71 
of observers’ particular preference for copying the majority. We consider this a 72 
potentially more parsimonious explanation – if observer monkeys could obtain the 73 
locally practiced foraging rule by the mere inclination to copy, there is no need for them 74 
to apply a cognitively more demanding rule like ‘conform to majorities’. 75 
 Typically, an investigation of whether individuals copy the majority with a 76 
higher probability than the relative size of the majority (henceforth ‘the disproportionate 77 
criterion’) is applied to ascertain that individuals are indeed majority-biased, or at least 78 
to exclude the possibility that individuals merely copy randomly (e.g. Laland, 2004; 79 
Mesoudi, 2009). We note that the disproportionate criterion can be viewed as rather 80 
stringent and unrealistic for cases in which individuals have already obtained a working 81 
strategy, where the key behaviour of interest is the foregoing of prior information for an 82 
alternative (‘conformity’). Indeed, the disproportionate criterion is typically used in the 83 
context of naive individuals setting out to obtain a useful strategy by means of social 84 
learning; the context in which conformist transmission (CT) is studied (e.g. Boyd & 85 
Richerson, 1985; Morgan et al., 2014). In the CT context, when individuals are 86 
confronted with a balanced population in which only two possible strategies exist, it is 87 
assumed that copiers solely rely on social information and thus have a 50% likelihood 88 
of obtaining one or the other strategy. Similarly, when strategy A is wielded by 70% of 89 
the demonstrators, and strategy B thus only by 30%, copiers have a 70% likelihood of 90 
obtaining strategy A by chance, i.e. if they were to apply a random copying rule. To 91 
show that individuals preferentially copy the majority, and not just by chance, the 92 
disproportionate criterion should be adhered to, meaning that in this case copiers should 93 
have a likelihood of obtaining strategy A that is significantly larger than 70%. However, 94 
in this same example, if individuals are not naive and thus have already learned to 95 
prefer one strategy over the other, e.g. strategy B, the assumption that they will obtain 96 
strategy A or B with a 50% likelihood (in the balanced 2-variant population) is 97 
unrealistic. Instead, these experienced individuals will most likely stick to their familiar 98 
strategy, in this case strategy B. In a similar vein, experienced strategy B users will not 99 
have a 70% chance of ending up with strategy A when 70% of the population they 100 
could sample from are strategy A users. If these experienced individuals turn out to start 101 
using strategy A with a 70% likelihood, in fact, one could consider this to be a strong 102 
indication (‘disproportionate’ in a sense) of majority influence (see Haun, Rekers & 103 
Tomasello, 2014). Thus, contrary to the CT setting, when individuals are experienced, it 104 
seems less valid to interpret a copying probability in accord with the relative majority 105 
size (here: 70%) in terms of random copying: past experience must be weighted in and 106 
perhaps a lower threshold than the majority display accepted as strong evidence for 107 
conformity (see van Leeuwen & Haun, 2014). 108 
 For the vervet monkeys (van de Waal et al., 2013), given that i) they were 109 
indeed experienced in preferring one food colour over the other when they encountered 110 
the opposing demonstrations in the new population, and ii) many of them chose to eat 111 
from the food colour in accord with these preference-opposing demonstrations (perhaps 112 
in numbers approximately matching the relative majority size, although here, crucially, 113 
this cannot be confirmed as the vervets’ observation records are missing; see below for 114 
more on this topic), this might indicate that ‘random copying’ could be dismissed as a 115 
mechanistic explanation in favour of ‘majority copying’. It is important to note, 116 
however, that this conclusion rests on the crucial assumption that no other variables 117 
were at play in the decision arena of the respective vervets, which is arguably not true. 118 
Notably, the immigrant vervets were leaving behind a familiar home range, and social 119 
setting, while moving into an unknown territory with unknown conspecifics (‘a 120 
different habitat’: van de Waal et al., 2013, p. 484). We could envisage the very 121 
predicament of the migrating vervets as sufficiently potent to induce a motivation to 122 
obtain new, locally more attuned behaviours (ecologically and/or socially). Van de 123 
Waal and colleagues (2013; also see Whiten & van de Waal, this volume) acknowledge 124 
that such drastic changes in the lives of the vervets could have facilitated the so-called 125 
‘copy-when-uncertain’ rule (Laland, 2004), a social learning heuristic for which 126 
evidence has been found across a wide range of taxa (e.g. see Kendal et al., 2009). They 127 
explicitly echo our suggestion by writing: “The fitness of foraging decisions made by 128 
wild primates like those we studied will be governed by a host of complex factors that 129 
are inherently unknown to foragers, ranging from dietary constituents to plant toxins 130 
and competing needs such as predator vigilance: Exploiting the prior discoveries of 131 
local experts may be an optimal strategy, overriding opposing knowledge gained in a 132 
different habitat such as one’s original group.” (van de Waal et al., 2013, p. 484). Yet, 133 
crucially, neither van de Waal et al. (2013) nor Whiten & van de Waal (this volume) 134 
consider the possibility that the ‘copy-when-uncertain’ heuristic alone could have 135 
caused the immigrants to adjust their foraging preference upon entering their new 136 
environment. It is entirely reasonable that the uncertainty of their new environment 137 
changed the default information-gathering mode of the immigrants to “copy” anybody 138 
(instead of relying on possibly out-dated and locally inadequate personal strategies). 139 
 Given the discussion above, and widespread local foraging traditions, the 140 
simplest form of copying – random copying – would equip the immigrating vervets 141 
with the local “majority” strategy. In other words, the transition from home to unknown 142 
territory could have reset the vervet monkeys, rendering prior information irrelevant, 143 
turning them effectively into naïve learners. We call this the “reset hypothesis”. One 144 
possible way to empirically test this hypothesis is to investigate whether immigrants 145 
would switch to the local foraging preference upon seeing a small number of residents 146 
showing a preference against an even larger background of non-behaving others, or, 147 
maybe a simpler case, upon seeing just one single resident’s demonstration of this 148 
preference (something that may have been opportunistically possible to assess had 149 
immigrant observation records been acquired, see below). If these observers would 150 
switch their preference, majorities would cease to be the single possible object of the 151 
immigrants’ copying efforts. Indeed, drawing on parsimony again, this finding would 152 
indicate that “conformity” is not even necessary to explain the immigrants’ behaviour. 153 
Note that even if one adheres to the conformity definition of ‘a willingness to subjugate 154 
one’s own countervailing knowledge in matching the majority’s choice’ – as in van de 155 
Waal et al. 2013 supplementary material p. 6 – one is still left with the burden of proof 156 
for the claim that ‘the majority’ is being matched, not just any individual. 157 
 Overall, the problem with interpreting the observations made by van de Waal et 158 
al. (2013) is the lack of nuance in the data regarding observer monkeys responding to 159 
different majority/minority ratios of (inadvertent) demonstrator monkeys. If observers 160 
are only presented with one stimulus (“the majority”), which consists of many other 161 
stimuli (“general social information”, “high-ranking individuals”, “low-ranking 162 
individuals”, “conspicuous individuals”, etc.), it is impossible to disentangle the very 163 
learning bias that the observers follow, while this is exactly what we want to know (e.g. 164 
see Heyes, 2016). For instance, if we were to investigate the evolutionary roots of 165 
conformist decision-making and we find that immigrant vervet monkeys, patas 166 
monkeys and rhesus macaques all adjust their preferences to the majority of the new 167 
group, we would need to know whether they were biased to “the majority” or to any 168 
other cue provided by the majority, for without this knowledge, the apparent similarity 169 
in decision-making strategies across these species may be purely coincidental. 170 
 171 
Majority of individuals versus majority of behaviours 172 
Due to our emphasis (van Leeuwen et al., 2015) upon the need for observation records 173 
in interpreting transmission events, we are delighted to find more detailed analysis on 174 
the observation records of the vervet monkeys (van de Waal et al., 2013) in their follow-175 
up paper (Whiten & van de Waal (this volume)). Whiten & van de Waal (this volume) 176 
present an analysis of how the number of individuals feeding from the locally-preferred 177 
food colour correlated with the number of behaviours (handfuls of corn) regarding this 178 
same food colour. Specifically, they state: “Indeed the two variables [individuals and 179 
behaviours] show a significant correlation across the twelve sample periods (r = 0.67, n 180 
= 12, p = 0.018). Accordingly we infer that the migrant males’ striking switch from 181 
their own to the opposite local preference was an effect of these majority displays, and 182 
hence a case of conformity” (Whiten & van de Waal, this volume, L69-73). To clarify, 183 
Whiten & van de Waal (this volume) aim to address a subject pertaining to the analysis 184 
of conformist transmission that was discussed in van Leeuwen et al. (2015) and Aplin et 185 
al. (2015a). In summary, where van Leeuwen et al. (2015) argued for keeping separate 186 
the biases of following the majority of individuals versus the majority of observed 187 
behaviours, and only reserving the term ‘conformist transmission’ for the former, Aplin 188 
et al. (2015a) argued for grouping the biases together under the same term, i.e. 189 
‘conformist transmission’. Aplin et al. (2015a) based their argument on the fact that in 190 
their original great tit study (Aplin et al. 2015b), the birds did not seem to distinguish 191 
between individuals and behaviours (analysed in Aplin et al. 2015a). Following up on 192 
this debate, Whiten & van de Waal (this volume) echo Aplin et al.’s position by 193 
showing that in their vervet monkey study (van de Waal et al., 2013) the frequency of 194 
individuals using a certain behavioural option and the frequency of demonstration of 195 
this particular behavioural option in total were not affecting the observers differently. In 196 
other words, the monkeys were indistinguishably following the majority of individuals 197 
and the majority of behaviours (Whiten & van de Waal, this volume). 198 
 While we acknowledge the additional analysis and appreciate its intent, we do 199 
not find it compelling for several reasons. First and foremost, in line with our previous 200 
arguments, Whiten & van de Waal (this volume) neither use the frequency of 201 
individuals nor behaviours to test their conformity hypothesis against any other (social) 202 
learning bias. Therefore, the reported correlation between the frequency of individuals 203 
and behaviours, while representing an affirmation of internal validity, has no power to 204 
falsify alternative hypotheses. For instance, Aplin et al. (2015b), though confronted with 205 
similar limitations due to working with wild animal populations, obtained detailed 206 
records of birds responding to differently-sized majorities and incorporated their 207 
majority numbers, in terms of individuals and behaviours, into statistical analyses to 208 
provide insight regarding whether the birds actually used the majority cue or merely 209 
obtained the most common strategy randomly. Without such analysis, our 210 
understanding of transmission biases is not furthered by the reporting of a correlation 211 
between two possible measures. Note that due to the very nature of “the majority” (i.e. 212 
comprising more than half of the sampled individuals) measures of for instance, skilful, 213 
conspicuous and high-ranking individuals will also coincide with the majority strategy. 214 
 Furthermore, we note that two cases of correlation between the number of 215 
individuals and behaviours indicating the use of a particular strategy (Aplin et al., 2015a 216 
and Whiten & van de Waal, this volume) do not constitute sufficient evidence in favour 217 
of the two measures being ‘functionally equivalent’. While scenarios in which the 218 
number of individuals and behaviours correlate are straightforward to envision, we 219 
could imagine other scenarios in which the two respective measures would diverge, 220 
either due to individual differences in performance rates (in conjunction with relative 221 
preferences for certain strategies) or population structure (increasing the likelihood of 222 
repetitively sampling the same individuals). Moreover, for reasons of informational 223 
accuracy, it may well matter if one individual “cries wolf” ten times, or if ten 224 
individuals (independently) do so once (e.g. see Wolf et al., 2013). We conjecture that 225 
the adaptive value of relying on indiscriminate sampling of behaviours versus relying 226 
on the aggregate knowledge of similarly poised, unpredictability-reducing conspecifics 227 
will differ to the extent that under certain conditions, one particular bias is expected to 228 
evolve (at the expense of the other). Formal modelling would be a constructive way 229 
forward in fuelling our understanding and expectations regarding this pending question, 230 
which was acknowledged by Aplin et al. (2015a). In the absence of such understanding, 231 
we fail to see how grouping two potentially distinct social learning biases (see Haun et 232 
al., 2012) under one and the same denominator of “conformist transmission” could be 233 
beneficial to the (comparative) study of learning biases. 234 
 235 
Methodological concern for using the majority of ‘behaviours’ instead of ‘individuals’ 236 
In addition to our conceptual arguments in favour of keeping separate the biases of 237 
relying on the majority of individuals versus the majority of behaviours (also see van 238 
Leeuwen et al., 2015), we now present a methodological argument in favour of this 239 
proposition. Specifically, we note that the gold standard to evidence conformist 240 
transmission has been to identify a sigmoidal relation between individuals’ probability 241 
to copy the majority and the proportional majority size (e.g., see Boyd & Richerson, 242 
1985; Chou & Richerson, 1992; Claidiere et al., 2012; Battesti et al., 2015; Aplin et al., 243 
2015b; but see Acerbi et al., under review). A simple agent-based model may help 244 
illustrate one of the problems arising from considering the frequencies of behaviours, 245 
instead of the frequencies of individuals, in detecting this sigmoidal signature of 246 
conformist transmission. 247 
 Imagine a population of individuals randomly initialised with one of two 248 
behaviours, A and B. At each time step, one individual X is randomly selected from the 249 
population, and performs its allocated behaviour, and another individual Y is also 250 
randomly selected from the population, and then Y always copies the behaviour 251 
performed by X. If one plots the relation between the probability of copying a behaviour 252 
and the frequency of individuals that possess that behaviour at time t, the relation is 253 
perfectly linear (see Figure 1, left). Each behaviour is, in other words, copied with a 254 
probability equal to the frequency of individuals that possess it in the population. This is 255 
exactly what we would expect with unbiased – i.e. random – copying (e.g. see Boyd & 256 
Richerson, 1985; Henrich & Boyd, 1998; Mesoudi, 2009). 257 
 258 
FIGURE 1. 259 
 260 
 However, if we plot the relation between the probability of copying a behaviour 261 
and the frequency of behaviour observed in the population, we obtain a sigmoidal 262 
relation, that can be mistaken for a signature of conformist transmission (see Figure 1, 263 
right). The reason for this result is that, as behaviours where randomly initialised, the 264 
total frequency (over all time steps) of the majority behaviour in the population will be, 265 
in most cases, lower than the frequency of individuals that possess that behaviour at 266 
time t. Imagine that behaviour A reaches fixation in the population. The probability to 267 
copy A will be 100%, but its cumulative frequency will be somewhat lower, as, at the 268 
beginning, at least some individuals performed behaviour B. This behavioural mixture 269 
is sufficient to create the effect in the bottom-left and top-right portions of the function, 270 
typical of a sigmoidal relation. 271 
 This effect is an artefact of how populations are initialised in the model, i.e. 272 
starting from a random mixture of the two behaviours, but it clearly shows that different 273 
analysis may lead to different results. More specifically, in this case, the analysis based 274 
on individuals reveals perfect linearity, in keeping with the individual-level random 275 
copying default, whereas the analysis based on behaviours reveals the sigmoidal 276 
relation between copying probability and relative frequency characteristic of conformist 277 
transmission (see Aplin et al., 2015b). In other words, the analysis based on behaviours 278 
leads to a detection of conformist transmission where clearly there is none (because all 279 
copying here is random). 280 
 A slightly more complex model shows an analogous result, without the need to 281 
initialise the populations in the above way. In this set-up, populations start naïve, and 282 
the two possible behaviours are instead introduced through individual innovations (each 283 
behaviour – A or B – with the same probability). Note that this set-up reflects the 284 
scenario in which conformist transmission is typically studied (e.g. Boyd & Richerson, 285 
1985; Henrich & Boyd, 1998; Morgan & Laland, 2012; van Leeuwen & Haun, 2014). 286 
The guiding copying mechanism is exactly the same as in the previous model, i.e. 287 
random copying remains the only form of copying. The only twist in our new model is 288 
that innovation rate decreases over time, mimicking individuals gradually converging 289 
on a certain variant preference (we believe this to be a realistic scenario). The results are 290 
analogous to the previous model: an analysis based on individuals shows perfect 291 
linearity in keeping with the random copying default, but an analysis based on 292 
behaviours reveals a sigmoidal relation between copying probability and the variant 293 
frequency in the population (see Figure 2). The reason for this result is that an initial 294 
innovation rate creates a situation in which both behaviours become present – similar to 295 
the random mixture of behaviours with which the populations were initialised in the 296 
first model – and, after that, populations again converge on one of the two behaviours, 297 
as innovation becomes less influential. Regardless, it is striking that even in the more 298 
typically studied scenario of naive individuals exploring a novel cultural landscape (the 299 
conformist transmission scenario), the illusion of conformist transmission can still 300 
emerge when analysis focuses on behaviours instead of individuals. 301 
 302 
FIGURE 2. 303 
 304 
 In conclusion, for reasons of conceptual, empirical and methodological clarity, 305 
we propose to keep the study of conformity and conformist transmission restricted to 306 
the level of individuals and pursue the study of the effects of repetitive exposure to 307 
stimuli or behaviours, regardless of their executors, in its own right. Accordingly, we 308 
note that in the seminal conformity studies “the majority” did not consist of behaviours 309 
but individuals. For instance, in the Asch studies (1956), “the majority” was assembled 310 
by a group of confederates each expressing one opinion, not by one confederate 311 
expressing his/her opinion multiple times (for studies on the (mere) exposure effect, see 312 
e.g. Bornstein, 1989; Zajonc, 1968). 313 
 314 
The pivotal role of observation records 315 
Finally, we wish to draw attention to the most prominent matter highlighted by van 316 
Leeuwen and colleagues (2015) in reference to the study of conformity in particular and 317 
social learning biases in general: observation records. Underlying all previous 318 
considerations, e.g. whether or not the social learning rule ‘copy high-rankers’ could 319 
explain the patterns described in van de Waal et al. (2013), lies the implicit assumption 320 
that the respective decision-makers have observed all available social information. We 321 
challenge this assumption and wish to emphasize that when it comes down to 322 
pinpointing (social) learning biases, it is essential that observation records are obtained 323 
and used in analysis, especially given that such data are accessible (e.g. see van 324 
Leeuwen et al., 2013; Kendal et al., 2015). 325 
 Whiten & van de Waal (this volume) respond to our previous criticism that in 326 
their original study (van de Waal et al., 2013) it was ‘unknown what and whom the 327 
immigrating males had observed prior to their preference switching’ (van Leeuwen et 328 
al., 2015, p.3) by stating that this is true for all studies, including experimental ones like 329 
that conducted by Haun and colleagues (2012). However, our criticism did not refer to 330 
the actual observations made by individuals – we agree that a certain level of 331 
assumption, ultimately even when using eye-tracking or more advanced technologies, is 332 
unavoidable. Instead, our criticism pertained to the assumption that the immigrants were 333 
somehow able to obtain knowledge of the available social information. The immigrant 334 
vervets’ observation records were entirely absent in the original study claiming to have 335 
identified conformity (van de Waal et al., 2013) and remain too imprecise for the 336 
investigation of conformity in the follow-up analysis (Whiten & van de Waal, this 337 
volume). In the first instance, we refer to records of what/whom the vervets could have 338 
observed because they were present when the social information (which would need to 339 
be quantified per observation bout) was available. In the second instance, head 340 
orientation during the inadvertent demonstrations seems a crucial measure to report. 341 
Such measures provide the necessary information to link an individual’s observational 342 
input (in this case: social information) to an individual’s behavioural output (in this 343 
case: maintaining or adjusting food colour preference), and thus the relevant 344 
information to draw conclusions on individuals’ specific learning biases. 345 
 Another example of individuals’ observation records receiving insufficient 346 
consideration concerns the recent great tit study by Aplin and colleagues (2015b). While 347 
this study provides detailed analyses of the birds’ tendencies to learn socially,  348 
including, importantly, their propensities to copy in response to different majority sizes, 349 
the very data central to their conformist transmission analyses rest on assumptions 350 
rather than observations. The authors derived an external measure of which birds 351 
typically flocked together and calculated an average ‘group length’ of flocking (i.e. 245 352 
seconds) that was subsequently used during the experiment in order to assume that all 353 
birds operating the experimental task in this time-window obtained knowledge of each 354 
other’s choices. In other words, the authors did not score which birds were 355 
simultaneously present at the experimental task (or which birds observed each other), 356 
but instead relied on the assumption that the birds were in the vicinity of the 357 
experimental task at the same time as the birds that were considered to be 358 
“demonstrators”, and the further assumption that they paid attention to those 359 
demonstrations (see Aplin et al., 2015b). We feel this to be an unfortunate caveat in an 360 
otherwise excellently conceived and conducted study. Regardless of the plausibility of 361 
such assumptions, observational input is the very measure from which we aim to derive 362 
conclusions on individual’s (social) learning biases, which, in our view, makes it 363 
imperative to be as accurate as possible. We wonder, for instance, whether the birds 364 
with the most extreme copying probabilities (0 and 100%) had observed that the entire 365 
sub-group of their sub-population had not converged on one particular strategy (see 366 
Figure 1 in Aplin et al., 2015a). These data seem crucial for the sigmoidal pattern to 367 
emerge, which was used to argue for conformist transmission in the birds’ social 368 
learning patterns (Aplin et al., 2015b). Notably, new modelling insights show that this 369 
very sigmoidal pattern can emerge in the absence of individuals’ being conformist 370 
biased (Acerbi et al., under review), making it even more pertinent to know what the 371 
birds observed exactly. 372 
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Figure Legends 455 
 456 
Figure 1. A population of N=100 individuals is randomly initialised with one of two 457 
behaviours. At each time step, a model and an observer are randomly extracted from the 458 
population, and the observer always copies the model. The simulation ends at 10,000 459 
time steps, i.e. 10,000 possible interactions. Results are based on 1,000 replications of 460 
the model. Simulated data are fitted with a linear and a sigmoid model. Copying 461 
probability is plotted against frequency of individuals (a), and frequency of behaviours 462 
(b). 463 
 464 
Figure 2. Simulations start with a population of N=100 naïve individuals. At each time 465 
step there is a probability that an individual, randomly extracted from the population, 466 
will innovate, i.e. will introduce, with equal probability, one of the two possible 467 
behaviours. Probability of innovation is initially equal to μ=.1 (one innovation every 10 468 
time steps on average), and decreases exponentially with time, according to 𝑒
−5𝑡
𝑇⁄ , 469 
where t is the current time step, and T is the maximum amount of time steps. In 470 
addition, at each time step, a model and an observer are randomly extracted from the 471 
population, and the observer always copies the model. The simulation ends at 10,000 472 
time steps, i.e. 10,000 possible interactions. Results are based on 1,000 replications of 473 
the model. Simulated data are fitted with a linear and a sigmoid model. Copying 474 
probability is plotted against frequency of individuals (a), and frequency of behaviours 475 
(b). 476 
